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Abstract
The paper develops a decentralized resource allocation mechanism for allocating divisi-
ble goods with capacity constraints to non-price-taking agents with general concave utilities.
The proposed mechanism is always budget balanced, individually rational, and it converges
to an optimal solution of the corresponding centralized problem. Such a mechanism is
very useful in a network with general topology and no auctioneer where the competitive
agents/users want different type of services.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation and Challenges
Most of today’s market networks support the delivery of a variety of goods to their
agents/ individuals. One of the main challenges in market networks is the design of re-
source allocation strategies which guarantee the delivery of different goods/services and
maximize some performance criterion (e.g. the network’s utility to its agents/individuals).
The challenge in determining such resource allocation strategies comes from the fact that
each agent’s utility is its own private information. The network (network manager) is
unaware of the agents’ utilities. If information were centralized, the resource allocation
problem could be formulated and solved as a mathematical programming problem or
as a dynamic programming problem. Since information is not centralized such formula-
tions are not possible. The challenge is to determine a decentralized message exchange
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2process among the agents and an allocation rule (based on the outcome of the message
exchange process) that eventually lead to a resource allocation that is optimal for the
corresponding centralized problem.
The above considerations have guided most of the research on resource allocation in
market networks. Basically, there are two microeconomic approaches have been used
for the development of efficient decentralized resource allocation schemes in market
networks: resource-oriented and price-oriented [1].
In the resource-oriented approach, each individual computes the marginal values for
his current resources, and communicates them to the rest of the agents. The allocation is
then changed so that agents with an above average marginal utility receive more of this
resource and agents with a below average marginal utility receive less. This approach
has been used in [2] to develop decentralized algorithms for optimally allocating a
single resource to a set of interconnected computing individuals. In the price-oriented
approach, an initial allocation of resources is made and an arbitrary set of systemwide
initial resource prices is chosen. Prices then are iteratively changed to accommodate the
demands for resources until the total demand for a resource exactly equals the total
amount available. Most of the results on decentralized resource allocation currently
available in the literature are based on the price-oriented approach [3]–[18]. In this
paper, since we follow the price-oriented approach to resource allocation, we critically
review the results reported in [3]–[18] so that we can point out to the contributions of
our work.
The work currently available on decentralized resource allocation by price-oriented
methods has addressed, either by analysis [5]–[7], [10]–[17], or simulation and analysis
[3], [7]–[9], [12]. A significant number of publications have dealt with single good [6]–
[9], [16], or with the allocation of a single resource per connection [4]–[14].
In several papers [5]–[7], [15]–[17] the following general philosophy to resource alloca-
tion by price-oriented methods has been adopted: (1) formulate a centralized constrained
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3optimization problem where the objective is the maximization of a social welfare func-
tion and the constraints are imposed by the availability of network resources; and (2)
use pricing methods to devise a decentralized scheme that realizes the solution of the
centralized problem and satisfies the informational constraints imposed by the network.
The existence of a solution to the centralized problem is shown, and market methods
are used to structure and develop the solution. The existence of a set of prices that
induce agents to request the optimal allocation is established and, in some cases [6],
[12], [15]–[17] an iterative scheme for adjusting the prices based on the agent’s requests
is described. However, none of the papers specify a mechanism to force the successive
prices to converge to the optimal set of prices.
Furthermore, in all of the aforementioned papers it is assumed that individuals/agents
act as if their behavior has no effect on the equilibrium prices reached by the mar-
ket/message allocation process. In other words, there is an auctioneer/network manager
who updates the prices according to the excess demand while the agents update their
demands based on the prices (i.e. the network periodically adjusts the prices based on
the monitored agent request for resources).
In this paper, we follow the price-oriented approach and the philosophy presented in
the previous paragraph, to address the resource allocation problem in market networks.
Our formulation of the resource allocation problem captures the issues and consid-
erations discussed in the first paragraph of this section. In particular, we consider
a connection-oriented network that can potentially offer multiple services/goods to
individuals. agents’ preferences are summarized by means of their utility functions, and
each agent is allowed to request more than one type of service/good. No assumption
is made on the functional form of the utility functions, although some mild regular-
ity conditions are imposed (see Section II). We assume that the relation between the
availability of goods and resource allocation is given (see discussion in Section II), and
we incorporate it as a constraint into a static optimization problem (the centralized
problem). The objective of the optimization problem is to determine the amount and,
required resources for each type of service/good to maximize the sum of the agents
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4utilities. We prove the existence of a solution of the optimization problem, and describe
a competitive market economy that implements the solution and satisfies the infor-
mational constraints imposed by the nature of the decentralized resource allocation
problem. In particular, in contrast to other papers that follow the philosophy of price-
oriented method we assume individuals/agents act as if their behavior has a direct
effect on the equilibrium prices reached by the market allocation process, we justify it
in Section I-B, due to this relaxation agents in market networks called non-price taking.
This relaxation is justified in fully decentralized networks/systems in which there is no
auctioneer (equivalently the designer is purely wealth redistributionary, see Section II)
to set the price and thus, due to the nature of the market problems [29], individuals
should converge, via a decentralized message exchange process, to the same price in a
distributed manner. A philosophy similar to ours with different objectives for the public
good problem has also been adopted in [19].
B. Contribution of the paper
The contributions of this paper are:
1) The formulation of a general optimization problem with non-price taking agents that
request multiple types of divisible goods with capacity constraint.
2) The discovery of a novel decentralized message exchange process/mechanism for allocating
divisible goods with capacity constraints to non-price-taking agents with general concave
utility functions which requires minimal coordination overhead and possesses the following
desirable properties:
(P1) The mechanism is always budget-balanced at every allocation.
(P2) The mechanism converges to an allocation (that we call it efficient stationary profile)
corresponding to an optimal solution of the centralized problem.
(P3) Every efficient stationary profile resulted from the mechanism is weakly preferable
than the initial endowment of each agent.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the decentralized resource allocation mecha-
nisms proposed so far for allocating divisible goods with capacity constraints possesses
simultaneously properties (P1-P3) with general concave utility functions and non-price-
taking agents.
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5C. Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II we formulate the centralized
problem with non-price-taking agents. In section III we describe the elements of the
mechanism we propose for achieving a solution of the centralized problem. In section
IV we analyze the properties of the proposed mechanism. We conclude in section V.
II. MODEL AND OBJECTIVES
A. General Model
In this problem, we have m non-price-taking agents and the set of agents is A =
{1, 2, . . . , m}. Suppose there are n goods which are each infinitely divisible; let L =
{l1, l2, . . . , ln} be the set of goods. There is only a limited amount of each good; the
maximum amount of lj available is denoted by clj , for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, and is always
nonnegative. Consider a specific agent i. Let Li = {li,1, li,2, . . . , li,|Li|} ⊆ L be the subset
of goods which may be requested by agent i. For each agent, the subset Li is known
and fixed in advance. The amount of goods actually demanded by the agent is given
by the demand vector xi = (xi,1, xi,2, . . . , xi,|Li|), where xi,k is the amount of good li,k
requested by i, for k = 1, 2, . . . , |Li|. For a given demand xi, the utility to agent i is the
function Ui : R
|Li| → R, Ui ∈ U , which is differentiable, concave, and satisfies Ui(0) = 0
and Ui(z) = −∞ if any entry of z is negative. Also, call x = (x1, . . . ,xm) to be the
overall demand of all agents. Furthermore, let Al ⊆ A be the set of agents who may
request good l; i.e., Al = {i : l ∈ Li}
1. Let us denote by −i to be the set of agents who
are not i; i.e., −i = A \ {i}. Then we can call x−i = {xj : j 6= i} and A
−i
l = Al \ {i}.
Suppose that we have a designer (e.g., network manager) who wants to design a
mechanism to maximize the social welfare
∑m
i=1[Ui(xi) − ti(xi)]. Here, ti : R
|Li| → R
consist of taxation policies on agents i, i = 1, . . . , m, and is to be designed. We consider
a scenario where the role of the designer is purely wealth redistributionary; there is no
net tax collected, so
∑m
i=1 ti(xi) = 0. Then, we can write the tax-explicit social welfare
1We assume |Al| > 2, ∀l ∈ L
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6maximization problem, that we call it Max1, as the following:
maximize
m∑
i=1
[Ui(xi)− ti(xi)]
subject to
m∑
i=1
ti(xi) = 0∑
i:l∈Li
xi,l ≤ cl, ∀l ∈ L
(1)
where the optimization variables are xi ∈ R
|Li| for all i ∈ A. The resulting taxes
charged to (or accrued by) the agents are denoted by the vector t = (t1, t2, . . . , tm), with
ti being shorthand for ti(xi).
B. The decentralized problem and the Objective
We consider the model of the previous subsection with the following assumptions on
its information structure.
(A1) Each agent only knows his own utility; this utility is his own private informa-
tion.
(A2) There is no auctioneer to set/adjust the price (price vector) per unit of ser-
vice/good(s).
(A3) Agents talk to each other in a broadcast setting, i.e., each agent hears every
other agent’s message. Therefore, agent i does not need to be aware of A−il , for
every l, l ∈ Li.
From the above description it is clear that the information in the network is decen-
tralized.
Under the above assumptions the objective is to determine a mechanism which has
the following properties:
(P1) The mechanism is individually rational (the agents voluntarily participate in
the mechanism).
(P2) The mechanism is balanced budget at every allocation.
(P3) The mechanism converges to an optimal solution of the corresponding central-
ized problem Max1.
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7Remark 1. Before proceeding with the specification of our mechanism, we further comment
on the appropriateness of the non-price taking behavior of individuals. The non-price taking
behavior is inspired by the following problem/environment:
“Consider a fully informationally decentralized system that only consists of a commu-
nity of competitive individuals and a set of goods that the individuals are interested
in obtaining them (or a subset of them). Under the assumption that the satisfaction
(utility) of each individual-which is a function of his demand profile (amount of goods
allocated to him) and his tax payment-is its private information, what is the optimal
demand profile for each individuals that maximize the social welfare?”
As it is observed from the above environment, individuals (should) act as if their behavior has
a direct effect on the equilibrium prices reached by the market allocation process. Further, since
there is no auctioneer who could be able to collect the taxes, the budget should also be balanced
because otherwise there might be money left unallocated at the end of the allocation process.
III. A MECHANISM FOR ALLOCATING DIVISIBLE GOODS
A. The components of the mechanism
A mechanism is described by (M, f), whereM = ×mi=1Mi is the message space, spec-
ifying for each agent i, i ∈ A, the set of messages Mi that agent i uses to communicate
to other agents, and f is an outcome function that describes the actions that are taken
for every m := (m1,m2, · · · ,mm) ∈M. The mechanism (M, f) is common knowledge
among the agents.
For the decentralized resource allocation problem formulated in section II we propose
a mechanism the components of which we describe below.
Message space: The message space for agent i, i ∈ A, is given byMi ⊂ R
2|Li|
+ . Specifically
a message of agent i is of the form
mi = (xi,l1 , xi,l2 , · · · , xi,l|Li| , pi,l1, pi,l2, · · · , pi,l|Li|) = (xi,pi)
where 0 ≤ xi,l ≤ cl and 0 ≤ pi,l ≤M, ∀i ∈ A, l ∈ Li, where 0 < M <∞. The component
xi,l denotes the amount of good l, l ∈ L, that agent i requests. The component pi,l, l ∈ Li,
denotes the price that agent i is willing to pay for the unit of good l.
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8Outcome Function: At any time slot n, n = 1, 2, · · · , the outcome function f is given by
f :M =M1 ×M2 × · · · ×Mm → R
m
+ × R
|L1| × R|L2| · · · × R|Lm|
and is defined as follows. For any
m(n) := (m
(n)
1 ,m
(n)
2 , · · · ,m
(n)
m ) ∈M,
f(m(n)) = f(m
(n)
1 ,m
(n)
2 , · · · ,m
(n)
m ) = (x
(n)
1 ,x
(n)
2 , · · · ,x
(n)
m , t1(m
(n)), t2(m
(n)), · · · , tm(m
(n)))
where at any time n, n = 1, 2, ..., (superscript (n) denotes time slot n) x
(n)
i = (x
(n)
i,l1
, x
(n)
i,l2
, · · · , x
(n)
i,l|Li|
)
and x
(n)
i,l , i ∈ A, is the amount of good l allocated to agent i, and ti(m
(n)) = (t
(n)
i,l1
, t
(n)
i,l2
, · · · , t
(n)
i,l|Li|
),
i ∈ A (ti,l is the tax (subsidy) agent i pays (receives) for good l, l ∈ Li). We proceed now
to specify t
(n)
i,l , l ∈ Li.
For every i ∈ A, l ∈ Li, n = 1, 2, 3, ...
t
(n)
i,l = w
(n)
−i,lx
(n)
i,l +
1
κ(n)
|p
(n)
i,l − p¯
(n)
l |
2
−w
(n)
−i,l
(
p
(n)
i,l − p
(n)
−i,l
)(x(n)i,l +∑j 6=i,j∈Al x(n)j,l − cl
γ
)
+
1{x
(n)
i,l > 0}1{E
(n)
−i,l + x
(n)
i,l > 0}
1− 1{x
(n)
i,l > 0}1{E
l
−i,l + x
(n)
i,l > 0}
+ φ
(n)
i,l I{|Al| > 2} (2)
where γ is fixed and sufficiently large,
0 < θ(n+1) < θ(n), lim
n→∞
θ(n) = 0,
lim
n→∞
κ(n) =∞, κ(n) :=
n∑
k=1
θ(k), for example θ(n) = 1
n
, n = 1, 2, 3, ... (3)
1{A} =

 1− ǫ if A holds;0 otherwise,
May 2011 DRAFT
9where ǫ is bigger than zero and sufficiently small,2 and
I{A} =

 1 if A holds;0 otherwise,
w
(n)
i,l =
∑n
k=1 θ
(k)p
(k)
i,l
κ(n)
, (4)
p¯
(n)
l =
∑
i∈Al
p
(n)
i,l
|Al|
, (5)
p
(n)
−i,l =
∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
p
(n)
j,l
|Al| − 1
, (6)
w
(n)
l =
∑n−1
k=0 θ
(k+1)p¯
(k)
l
κ(n)
, (7)
w
(n)
−i,l =
∑
j∈Al,j 6=i
w
(n)
i,l
|Al| − 1
, (8)
E
(n)
−i,l =
{ ∑
j∈Al,j 6=i
x
(n)
j
}
− cl, (9)
E
(n)
i,l = (|Al| − 1)x
(n)
i − cl, (10)
2Therefore, when A and B (both) hold, then 1{A}1{B}
1−1{A}1{B}
≈ 1
0+
is well defined and it becomes a large number.
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φ
(n)
i,l = −
1
κ(n)|Al|2

(|Al| − 1)∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
(p
(n)
j )
2 +

∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
p
(n)
j


2

+
1
κ(n)|Al|2

2 (|Al| − 1)
∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
∑
k∈Al
k 6=i,j
p
(n)
j,l p
(n)
k,l
|Al| − 2


−
∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
∑
k∈Al
k 6=i,j
x
(n)
j,l w
(n)
k,l
(|Al| − 2) (|Al| − 1)
+
∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
∑
k∈Al
k 6=i,j
p
(n)
j,l x
(n)
j,l w
(n)
k,l
γ (|Al| − 2) (|Al| − 1)
−
∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
∑
k∈Al
k 6=i,j
∑
r∈Al
r 6=i,j,k
p
(n)
k,l x
(n)
j,l w
(n)
r,l
(|Al| − 1)2γ(|Al| − 3)
−
w
(n)
−i,lp
(n)
−i,lE
(n)
−i,l
γ
+
∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
∑
k∈Al
k 6=i,j
p
(n)
k,l E
(n)
j,l w
(n)
j,l
(|Al| − 1)2γ(|Al| − 2)
−
∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
∑
k∈Al
k 6=i,j
p
(n)
k,l x
(n)
j,l w
(n)
k,l
(|Al| − 1)2γ(|Al| − 2)
+
∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
∑
k∈Al
k 6=i,j
∑
r∈Al
r 6=i,j,k
p
(n)
r,l E
(n)
j,l w
(n)
k,l
(|Al| − 1)2γ(|Al| − 3)
. (11)
Next we specify additional subsidies Qi that agent i, i ∈ A, may receive. For that matter
we consider all goods l ∈ L such that |Al| = 3. For each good l, with |Al| = 3 we define
the
Q
(n)
{l:|Al|=3}
= −w
(n)
−i,lx
(n)
i,l −
1
κ(n)
|p
(n)
i,l − p¯
(n)
l |
2
+w
(n)
−i,l
(
p
(n)
i,l − p
(n)
−i,l
)(x(n)i,l +∑j 6=i,j∈Al x(n)j,l − cl
γ
)
(a)
= o(1)− w
(n)
−i,lx
(n)
i,l −
1
κ(n)
|p
(n)
i,l − p¯
(n)
l |
2, (12)
where (a) follows since γ is chosen sufficiently large.
Furthermore for each good l ∈ L where |Al| = 3 an agent kl ∈ Al is chosen, randomly,
to assign the subsidy Q
(n)
{l:|Al|=3}
. Let l1, l2, · · · , lr be the set of goods such that |Ali| =
3, i = 1, 2, 3, · · · , r, be the corresponding agents that receive Q
(n)
{l:|Al|=3}
.
Based on the above, the tax (subsidy) paid (received) by agent j, j ∈ A, is the following.
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If j 6= kl1, kl2 , · · ·klr then
t
(n)
j =
∑
l∈Lj
tnj,l, (13)
If j = kli, i = 1, 2, · · · , r, then
t
(n)
kli
=
∑
l∈Lkli
t
(n)
kli ,l
+Q
(n)
{li:|Ali |=3}
, (14)
where Q
(n)
{l:|Al|=3}
is defined by (12).
Note that Q
(n)
{li:|Ali |=3}
is not controlled by agent kli , that is, Q
(n)
{li:|Ali |=3}
does not depend
on agent kli ’s message. Thus, the presence (or absence) of Q
(n)
{li:|Ali |=3}
does not influence
the strategic behavior of agent kli . We have assumed here that the agents kl1, kl2 , · · · , klr
, are distinct. Expressions similar to the above hold when the agents kl1 , kl2, · · · , klr are
not distinct.
Remark 2. For each good l ∈ L with |Al| = 3, we could equally divide the subsidy Q
(n)
{l:|Al|=3}
among all agents not in Al instead of randomly choosing one agent k ∈ Al. Any other division
of the subsidy Al among agents not in Al would also work.
B. The dynamic of the mechanism
The dynamic of the mechanism is as follows. Note that (x(1),p(1)) is given, arbitrary,
and feasible.
• At time n ≥ 1: every agent i, i ∈ A solves and reports
(x
(n+1)
i ,p
(n+1)
i ) := argmax
xi,pi
{
Ui(x
(n)
i )−
∑
l∈Li
t
(n)
i,l
}
(15)
where
t
(n)
i,l = w
(n)
−i,lxi,l +
1
κ(n)
|pi,l − p¯
(n)
l |
2
−w
(n)
−i,l
(
pi,l − p
(n)
−i,l
)(xi,l +∑j 6=i,j∈Al x(n)j,l − cl
γ
)
+φ
(n)
i,l (16)
May 2011 DRAFT
12
and φ
(n)
i,l is defined as (11).
Before proceeding further we define some notations and concepts.
Definition 1. A taxation scheme t = (t1, . . . , tm) is budget-balanced if the sum of taxes is
zero; i.e.,
∑m
i=1 ti = 0.
In other words, budget-balance means that the sum of taxes paid by some of the
agents is equal to the sum of the money (subsidies) received by the rest of the agents
participating in the allocation process. Budget balance implies that there is no money
left unallocated at the end of the allocation.
Definition 2 (Stationary profile (SP)). A message profile m∗ = (m∗1,m
∗
2, · · · ,m
∗
m),m
∗ ∈
M, is called stationary profile if for any i, i ∈ A,
Ui(x
∗
i )− ti(m
∗
i ,m
∗
−i) ≥ Ui(xi)− ti(mi,m
∗
−i) ∀ mi ∈Mi. (17)
In the other words, a stationary profile is a message profile that unilateral deviation
is not profitable for any agents3.
Definition 3 (Individual rationality). A message profile m = (m1,m2, · · · ,mm),m ∈M,
is weakly preferred by all agents to the initial allocation (0, 0) if
Ui(xi)− ti(m) ≥ Ui(0)− 0 = 0, ∀ i ∈ A. (18)
A mechanism is called Individually rational if the above property is satisfied at any stationary
profile, that is, agents are incentivized to participate voluntarily in the mechanism.
In other words, Individual rationality asserts that at any stationary profile the utility
of each user is at least as much as its utility before participating in the mechanism.
C. Interpretation of the mechanism
It observes that the designer of the mechanism can not alter the agents’ utility func-
tions, that is Ui, i ∈ A, is agent i
′s private information. Therefore, the only way to
3It is important to note that the nature of the stationary profile is similar to the concept of Nash equilibrium. But,
in Nash equilibrium agents’ utilities are common knowledge among the agents where as here agents’ utilities are
their private information.
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achieve the optimal solution of the corresponding centralized problem is through the
use of appropriate tax functions/incentive. For each good, the tax functions of our
mechanism consists of three components Υ
(n)
1 , Υ
(n)
2 and Υ
(n)
3 , at each time slot n. We
specify and interpret these components in the following.
At each time slot n, n = 1, 2, · · · , equation (2) can be decomposed as follows,
t
(n)
i,l = Υ
(n)
1 +Υ
(n)
2 +Υ
(n)
3
where
Υ
(n)
1 := w
(n)
−i,lx
(n)
i,l
Υ
(n)
2 :=
1
κ(n)
|p
(n)
i,l − p¯
(n)
l |
2
−w
(n)
−i,l
(
p
(n)
i,l − p
(n)
−i,l
)(x(n)i,l +∑j 6=i,j∈Al x(n)j,l − cl
γ
)
+
1{x
(n)
i,l > 0}1{E
(n)
−i,l + x
(n)
i,l > 0}
1− 1{x
(n)
i,l > 0}1{E
l
−i,l + x
(n)
i,l > 0}
Υ
(n)
3 := φ
(n)
i,l
• Υ
(n)
1 specifies the amount agent i has to pay for good l, l ∈ Li. It is important
to note that the price per unit of a good that agent i pays is determined by the
message/proposal of the other agents requesting the same good. Thus, agent i does
not control the price it pays or receives.
• Υ
(n)
2 provides the following incentives to the agents, i, i ∈ Al: (1) To bid/propose
the same price per unit of good l, l ∈ L. (2) To collectively request a total request
for the good does not exceed the available capacity of the good. The incentive
provided to all agents to bid the same price per unit of good l is captured by the
term 1
κ(n)
|p
(n)
i,l − p¯
(n)
l |
2. The incentive provided to all agents to collectively request a
total request that does not exceed the available capacity is imposed by the term
1{x
(n)
i,l > 0}1{E
(n)
−i,l + x
(n)
i,l > 0}
1− 1{x
(n)
i,l > 0}1{E
l
−i,l + x
(n)
i,l > 0}
,
Note that an agent is very heavily (infinitely) penalized if it requests a nonzero
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amount of a good, and, collectively, all the agents of the good request a total that
exceeds the available capacity. A joint incentive provided to all agents to bid the
same price per unit of good and to utilize the total capacity of the good is captured
by the term
w
(n)
−i,l
(
p
(n)
i,l − p
(n)
−i,l
)(x(n)i,l +∑j 6=i,j∈Al x(n)j,l − cl
γ
)
• Υ
(n)
3 , the goal of this component is to lead to a balanced budget. Further, it is
important to note that Υ
(n)
3 is not controlled by the agent i’s message, thus, it does
not influence over its behavior.
IV. PROPERTIES OF THE MECHANISM
In this section we prove that the mechanism proposed in Section III has the following
properties: It is individually rational. It is budget-balanced at every feasible allocation.
It converges to an optimal solution of the centralized problem Max1.
We establish the above properties by proceeding as follows. First we show some prop-
erties of a stationary profile of the mechanism, Lemma 1. Then, we show that agents
voluntarily participate in the allocation process. We do this by showing that the alloca-
tions they receive at all efficient stationary profile of the mechanism is weakly preferred
to the (0, 0) allocation they receive when they do not participate in the mechanism,
Theorem 2. Afterwards, we establish that the mechanism is budget-balanced at all
feasible allocations, Lemma 3. Finally, we show that the mechanism converges to an
optimal solution of the centralized allocation problem Max1, Theorem 4.
We present the proofs of the following theorems and lemmas in Appendix.
The following lemma presents some key properties of a stationary profile.
Lemma 1. Let m∗ = (x∗,p∗) be a stationary profile. Then for every l ∈ L and i ∈ Al, we
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have,
p∗i,l = p
∗
j,l = p
∗
l , (19)
w∗i,l
(∑
i,i∈Al
x∗i,l − cl
γ
)
= 0, (20)
∂Ui(xi)
∂xi,l
∣∣∣∣
m=m∗
= w∗−i,l. (21)
In the rest of the paper, we restrict our attention to the class of stationary profiles
defined as follows.
Definition 4. Any stationary profile m∗ of the mechanism is called efficient stationary profile
if for any i, i ∈ A and l, l ∈ L, the following holds
w∗i,l = w
∗
j,l = w−i,l =: w
∗
l i, j ∈ Al, l ∈ L. (22)
The following theorem shows that the mechanism proposed in Section III is individ-
ually rational, i.e., agents voluntarily participate in the mechanism.
Theorem 2. Every efficient stationary profile, m∗ = (x∗, t∗), of the mechanism is weakly
preferred by all agents to the initial allocation (0, 0).
By the following theorem, we show that, along the allocation process, the sum of
taxes paid by some of the agents is always equal to the sum of the money (subsidies)
received by the rest of the agents participating in the allocation process.
Theorem 3. The proposed mechanism is always budget balanced at every feasible allocation.
That is, the mechanism is budget-balanced at all allocations.
Finally, we show that the mechanism converges to an allocation corresponding to a
solution of the centralized allocation problem Max1.
Theorem 4. The sequence {w
(n)
i,l }
∞
n=1 tends to the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers of the
centralized problem Max1 and {xni,l}
∞
n=1 converges to the optimal solution of Max1. In other
words, the proposed mechanism converges to an efficient stationary profile that corresponds to
the solution of Max1.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed a mechanism for allocating divisible goods with
capacity constraints to non-price-taking agents with general concave utility which pos-
sesses the following desirable properties. (i) The mechanism is always budget-balanced
at every allocation. (ii) The mechanism converges to an stationary profile (efficient
stationary profile) that corresponds to an optimal solution of the corresponding cen-
tralized problem. (iii) Every stationary profile (efficient stationary profile) resulted from
the mechanism is weakly preferable than initial endowment of each agent.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider agent i ∈ Al. Since agent i does not control φi,l defined
by (11), (i.e. φi,l does not depend on xi,l and pi,l),
∂φi,l
∂xi,l
=
∂φi,l
∂pi,l
= 0. (23)
Now, Let m∗ be a stationary profile, then
∂{Ui(xi)−
∑
l∈Li
ti,l}
∂xi,l
|m=m∗ = 0 (24)
∂{Ui(xi)−
∑
l∈Li
ti,l}
∂pi,l
|m=m∗ = 0. (25)
Equation (25) implies that
2
1− 1
|Al|
κ(SP )
(
p∗i,l − p¯
∗
l
)
− w∗−i,l
(
x∗i +
∑
j∈Al,j 6=i
x∗j − cl
γ
)
= 0,
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where κ(SP ) means at the stationary profile m∗. Taking a sum over all i, i ∈ Al, and
using the fact that
∑
i∈Al
(p∗i,l − p¯
∗
l ) = 0, result in
∑
i∈Al
w∗−i,l
(
x∗i +
∑
j∈Al,j 6=i
x∗j − cl
γ
)
= 0. (26)
Therefore, for every i,
w∗−i,l
(
x∗i +
∑
j∈Al,j 6=i
x∗j − cl
γ
)
= 0. (27)
Substituting (27) in (26) gives
p∗i,l = p¯
∗
l , ∀ l ∈ L, i ∈ Al, (28)
and consequently,
p∗i,l = p
∗
j,l = p
∗
−i,l, ∀ i, j ∈ Al, l ∈ L. (29)
Equation (24) together with (29) and form of the tax (Eq. (2)) imply that
∂Ui(xi)
∂xi,l
|m=m∗ = w
∗
−i,l. (30)
Proof of Theorem 2: As it is pointed out in section II, for simplicity we assume for
every i, i ∈ A, Ui(0) = 0, and initial endowment of each agent is zero. Let m
∗ = (x∗, t∗)
be a stationary profile then we have
{Ui(xi)− ti}|m=m∗ ≥ {Ui(xi)− ti}|m=(mi,m∗−i) (31)
Thus, it is enough to findmi = (xi,pi) = (xi,l1 , xi,l2 , · · · , xi,l|Li| , pi,l1, pi,l2, · · · , pi,l|Li|), lk ∈
Li, 1 ≤ k ≤ |Li|, such that {Ui(xi)− ti}|m=(mi,m∗−i) becomes zero. To do so, choose
xi = 0 = (0, 0, · · · , 0), (32)
and for any l, l ∈ Li, choose pi,l = ηi,l,
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ηi,l =
√(
w∗l
E∗−i,l
γ
)2
+ 4 1
κ(SP )
(
|Al|−1
|Al|
)2
w∗l x
∗
−i,l + 2
1
κ(SP )
(
|Al|−1
|Al|
)2
p∗l + w
∗
l
E∗−i,l
γ
2 1
κ(SP )
(
|Al|−1
|Al|
)2 (33)
where ηi,l is the positive root of the following quadratic polynomial with respect to pi,l,
ti,l|m=(mi,m∗−i) =
1
κ(SP )
(
|Al| − 1
|Al|
)2
(pi,l − p
∗
l )
2 − w∗l (pi,l − p
∗
l )
(
E∗−i,l
γ
)
+ φ∗l
= p2i,l
[
1
κ(SP )
(
|Al| − 1
|Al|
)2]
− pi,l
[
2p∗l
1
κ(SP )
(
|Al| − 1
|Al|
)2
+ w∗l
E−i,l
γ
]
+
[
1
κ(SP )
(
|Al| − 1
|Al|
)2
(p∗l )
2 + w∗l p
∗
l
E∗−i,l
γ
− w∗l x
∗
−i,l
]
,
where
φ∗l = −w
∗
l x
∗
−i,l, (34)
x∗−i,l =
∑
j∈Al,j 6=i
x∗j
|Al| − 1
. (35)
Therefore, choosing mi = (0, ηi,l1 , ηi,l2, · · · , ηi,l|Li|), lk ∈ Li, 1 ≤ k ≤ |Li|, implies that
{Ui(xi)− ti}|m=(mi,m∗−i) = Ui(0)−
∑
l,l∈Li
ti,l|m=(mi,m∗−i) = 0. (36)
Consequently,
{Ui(xi)− ti}|m=(m∗) ≥ 0, ∀i. (37)
Proof of Theorem 3: We want to show that
∑
i,i∈A ti =
∑
l,l∈L
[∑
i,i∈Al
ti,l
]
= 0. To
prove this, we show that
∑
i,i∈Al
ti,l = 0 for any l, l ∈ L. By a little algebra we can show
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the following equalities,
∑
i∈Al
w
(n)
−i,lx
(n)
i,l =
∑
i∈Al
Ψ1(i), (38)
∑
i∈Al
1
κ(n)
|p
(n)
i,l − p¯
(n)
l |
2 =
∑
i∈Al
Ψ2(i), (39)
∑
i∈Al
[
−w
(n)
−i,lp
(n)
i,l
x
(n)
i,l
γ
]
=
∑
i∈Al
Ψ3(i), (40)
∑
i∈Al
[
−w
(n)
−i,lp
(n)
i,l
E
(n)
−i,l
γ
]
=
∑
i∈Al
Ψ4(i), (41)
∑
i∈Al
[
w
(n)
−i,lp
(n)
−i,l
x
(n)
i,l
γ
]
=
∑
i∈Al
Ψ5(i), (42)
where
Ψ1(i) =
∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
∑
k∈Al
k 6=i,j
x
(n)
j,l w
(n)
k,l
(|Al| − 2) (|Al| − 1)
,
Ψ2(i) =
1
κ(n)|Al|2
[
(|Al| − 1)
∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
(p
(n)
j )
2 +

∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
p
(n)
j


2
−
2 (|Al| − 1)
∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
∑
k∈Al
k 6=i,j
p
(n)
j,l p
(n)
k,l
|Al| − 2
]
,
Ψ3(i) = −
∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
∑
k∈Al
k 6=i,j
p
(n)
j,l x
(n)
j,l w
(n)
k,l
γ (|Al| − 2) (|Al| − 1)
,
Ψ4(i) = −
[∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
∑
k∈Al
k 6=i,j
∑
r∈Al
r 6=i,j,k
p
(n)
r,l E
(n)
j,l w
(n)
k,l
(|Al| − 1)2γ(|Al| − 3)
+
∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
∑
k∈Al
k 6=i,j
p
(n)
k,l E
(n)
j,l w
(n)
j,l
(|Al| − 1)2γ(|Al| − 2)
]
,
Ψ5(i) =
[∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
∑
k∈Al
k 6=i,j
∑
r∈Al
r 6=i,j,k
p
(n)
k,l x
(n)
j w
(n)
r,l
(|Al| − 1)2γ(|Al| − 3)
+
∑
j∈Al
j 6=i
∑
k∈Al
k 6=i,j
p
(n)
k,l x
(n)
j w
(n)
k,l
(|Al| − 1)2γ(|Al| − 2)
]
. (43)
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Furthermore,
φ
(n)
i,l = −
{
Ψ2(i) + Ψ1(i) + Ψ3(i) + Ψ4(i) + Ψ5(i) +
w
(n)
−i,lp
(n)
−i,lE
(n)
−i,l
γ
}
. (44)
Therefore, from Eqs. (38)-(44) we obtain that for any l, l ∈ L,
∑
i,i∈Al
ti,l = 0 because,
∑
i,i∈Al
{
w
(n)
−i,lx
(n)
i,l +
1
κ(n)
|p
(n)
i,l − p¯
(n)
l |
2 − w
(n)
−i,l
(
p
(n)
i,l − p
(n)
−i,l
)(x(n)i,l +∑j 6=i,j∈Al x(n)j,l − cl
γ
)}
+
∑
i,i∈Al
φ
(n)
i,l = 0. (45)
Proof of Theorem 4: By rearranging (15) we have the following,
Ui(x
(n)
i )−
∑
l,l∈Li
t
(n)
i,l
∣∣∣
x=x(n),p−i=p
(n)
−i
= Υi(pi)−
∑
l,l∈Li
|pi,l − p¯
(n)
l |
2
κ(n)
(46)
where
Υi(pi) = Ui(x
(n)
i )−
∑
l∈Li
{
w
(n)
−i,lx
(n)
i,l − w
(n)
−i,l
(
pi,l − p
(n)
−i,l
)(x(n)i,l +∑j 6=i,j∈Al x(n)j,l − cl
γ
)
+ φ
(n)
i,l
}
.
To prove the convergence, first we state and prove some Lemmas we need to prove
the theorem.
Lemma 5. For any l, l ∈ L and i, i ∈ Al, there exists at least one subsequence (with the same
indices) of w
(n)
i,l which is convergent.
Proof: The proof directly follows by employing Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, and
the fact that pi,l ∈ [0,M ] for any i ∈ A and l ∈ L.
Lemma 6. The following holds for any t, t ∈ N, i, i ∈ A and l, l ∈ L
κ(t+1)Υi(p
(t+1)
i )−
∑
l∈Li
|p
(t+1)
i,l − pl|
2 +
∑
l∈Li
|p¯
(t)
l − pl|
2 −
∑
l∈Li
|p
(t+1)
i,l − p¯
(t)
l |
2 ≥ κ(t+1)Υi(p) (47)
for any p ∈ ∆4.
4∆,∆ ⊂ R|L| is a bounded convex set that every bundle of the prices can be chosen from it
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Proof: The proof of this Lemma comes directly from the extension of Theorem 1.65,
p. 12 of [20], by taking | · |2 as function J1(·) and Ui(·) as function J2(·).
Lemma 7. We have the following for any i, i ∈ A
∑
l∈Li
∑n−1
k=0 |p
(k+1)
i,l − p¯
(k)
l |
2
κ(n)
< Λ1, ∀ n. (48)
where Λ1 is a constant.
Proof: From Lemma 6 the following holds for any i, i ∈ A,
κ(t+1)Υi(p
(t+1)
i )−
∑
l∈Li
|p
(t+1)
i,l − pl|
2 +
∑
l∈Li
|p¯
(t)
l − pl|
2
−
∑
l∈Li
|p
(t+1)
i,l − p¯
(t)
l |
2 ≥ κ(t+1)Υi(p) (49)
Adding (49) over all i implies
∑
i∈A
κ(t+1)Υi(p
(t+1)
i )−
∑
i∈A
∑
l∈Li
|p
(t+1)
i,l − pl|
2
+
∑
i∈A
∑
l∈Li
|p¯
(t)
l − pl|
2 −
∑
i∈A
∑
l∈Li
|p
(t+1)
i,l − p¯
(t)
l |
2
≥
∑
i∈A
κ(t+1)Υi(p). (50)
By a simple algebra we can obtain
∑
i∈A
∑
l∈Li
|p¯
(t)
l − pl|
2 =
∑
l∈L
|Al||p¯
(t)
l − pl|
2. (51)
5Theorem 1.6 [20]: Consider the function J(v) = J1(v) + J2(v) where we assume that the functions Ji(v), i = 1, 2,
are continuous, convex, and lower semi-continuous in the weak topology. Further let
J(v)→ +∞ as ||v|| → +∞.
We assume that the function v → J1(v) is differentiable, but J2 is not necessarily differentiable. Finally assume that
J is strictly convex. Then the unique element of u such that J(u) = infv J(v) is characterized by
J
′
1(u) · (v − u) + J2(v)− J2(u) ≥ 0 ∀ v.
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Furthermore, due to the convexity of | · |2, observes that
|p¯
(t+1)
l − pl|
2 ≤
∑
i∈Al
|p¯
(t+1)
i,l − pl|
2
|Al|
, (52)
thus,
∑
l∈L
|Al||p¯
(t+1)
l − pl|
2 ≤
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈Al
|p¯
(t+1)
i,l − pl|
2. (53)
Employing (51) and (53) in (50) imply that
∑
i∈A
κ(t+1)Υi(p
(t+1)
i )−
∑
l∈L
|Al||p¯
(t+1)
l − pl|
2
+
∑
l∈L
|Al||p¯
(t)
l − pl|
2 −
∑
i∈A
∑
l∈Li
|p
(t+1)
i,l − p¯
(t)
l |
2
≥
∑
i∈A
κ(t+1)Υi(p). (54)
Adding (54) over t, t = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1 results in
n−1∑
t=0
∑
i∈A
κ(t+1)Υi(p
(t+1)
i )−
n−1∑
t=0
∑
i∈A
∑
l∈Li
|p
(t+1)
i,l − p¯
(t)
l |
2
−
∑
l∈L
|Al|
n−1∑
t=0
{
|p¯
(t+1)
l − pl|
2 − |p¯
(t)
l − pl|
2
}
≥
n−1∑
t=0
∑
i∈A
κ(t+1)Υi(p). (55)
¿From (55) we get
n−1∑
t=0
∑
i∈A
κ(t+1)Υi(p
(t+1)
i )−
∑
l∈L
|Al||p¯
(n)
l − pl|
2
−
n−1∑
t=0
∑
i∈A
∑
l∈Li
|p
(t+1)
i,l − p¯
(t)
l |
2
≥ κ(n)
∑
i∈A
Υi(p)−
∑
l∈L
|Al||p¯
(0)
l − pl|
2. (56)
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Since for any i, i ∈ A, Υi(pi) is affine in pi, thus∑n−1
t=0 κ
(n+1)Υi(p
(t+1)
i )
κ(n)
= Υi(w
(n)
i ), (57)
subsequently,
n−1∑
t=0
∑
i∈A
κ(n+1)Υi(p
(t+1)
i ) = κ
(n)
∑
i∈A
Υi(w
(n)
i ), (58)
Substituting (58) in (56) and dividing by κ(n) result in
∑
i∈A
Υi(w
(n)
i )−
∑
l∈L |Al||p¯
(n)
l − pl|
2
κ(n)
−
∑n−1
t=0
∑
i∈A
∑
l∈Li
|p
(t+1)
i,l − p¯
(t)
l |
2
κ(n)
≥
∑
i∈A
Υi(p)−
∑
l∈L |Al||p¯
(0)
l − pl|
2
κ(n)
. (59)
Since ∆ is a bounded set and limn→∞ κ
(n) =∞, thus
lim
n→∞
∑
l∈L |Al||p¯
(n)
l − pl|
2
κ(n)
= 0, (60)
lim
n→∞
∑
l∈L |Al||p¯
(0)
l − pl|
2
κ(n)
= 0. (61)
Similarly,
lim
n→∞
∑n−1
t=0
∑
i∈A
∑
l∈Li
|p
(t+1)
i,l − p¯
(t)
l |
2
κ(n)
= 0. (62)
Consequently, using (60),(61) and (62) in (59) and the fact that Υi(pi) for any i, i ∈ A,
is bounded, the proof of the lemma is complete, i.e., there exists Λ1 such that∑
l∈Li
∑n−1
k=0 |p
(k+1)
i,l − p¯
(k)
l |
2
κ(n)
< Λ1, ∀ n. (63)
Lemma 8. For any i, i ∈ A, we have
lim
n′→∞
|w
(n′)
i,l − w
(n′)
l |
2 = 0, ∀ l ∈ Li. (64)
May 2011 DRAFT
25
Proof: Since | · |2 is convex, thus
|w
(n′)
i,l − w
(n′)
l |
2 ≤
∑n′−1
t=0 κ
(t+1)|p
(t+1)
i,l − p
(t)
l |
2
κ(n)
. (65)
Now, we must show that
∀ ǫ > 0, ∃nǫ, s.t., ∀ n
′ > nǫ,
∑
l∈Li
|w
(n′)
i,l − w
(n′)
l |
2 < ǫ. (66)
¿From (65), for any n′ > nǫ we have,
∑
l∈Li
|w
(n′)
i,l − w
(n′)
l |
2 ≤
∑
l∈Li
∑n′−1
t=0 κ
(t+1)|p
(t+1)
i,l − p
(t)
l |
2
κ(n
′)
=
∑
l∈Li
∑nǫ−1
t=0 κ
(t+1)|p
(t+1)
i,l − p
(t)
l |
2
κ(n
′)
+
∑
l∈Li
∑n′−1
t=nǫ
κ(t+1)|p
(t+1)
i,l − p
(t)
l |
2
κ(n
′)
≤
∑
l∈Li
κ(1)
∑nǫ−1
t=0 |p
(t+1)
i,l − p
(t)
l |
2
κ(n
′)
+
∑
l∈Li
κ(nǫ)
∑n′−1
t=nǫ
|p
(t+1)
i,l − p
(t)
l |
2
κ(n
′)
=
κ(1)
∑
l∈Li
∑nǫ−1
t=0 |p
(t+1)
i,l − p
(t)
l |
2
κ(n
′)
+
κ(nǫ)
∑
l∈Li
∑n′−1
t=nǫ
|p
(t+1)
i,l − p
(t)
l |
2
κ(n
′)
.
Since ∆ is bounded, thus there exists Λ2 such that
∑
l∈Li
nǫ−1∑
t=0
|p
(t+1)
i,l − p
(t)
l |
2 < Λ2. (67)
Furthermore, κ(n
′) tends to infinity as n′ goes to infinity, thus we can choose n1ǫ large
enough so that
κ(n
′) >
2κ(1)Λ2
ǫ
, ∀ n′ > n1ǫ . (68)
Moreover, using Lemma 7 implies that
∑
l∈Li
∑n′−1
t=nǫ
|p
(t+1)
i,l − p
(t)
l |
2
κ(n
′)
< Λ1. (69)
Since κ(n
′) tends to zero as n′ goes to infinity, thus
∃ n2ǫ , s.t. κ
(nǫ) <
ǫ
2Λ1
. (70)
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Choosing nǫ = max{n
1
ǫ , n
2
ǫ} together with (68) and (70) implies that
∑
l∈Li
|w
(n′)
i,l − w
(n′)
l |
2 < ǫ, ∀ n′ > nǫ, (71)
Therefore,
lim
n′→∞
∑
l∈Li
|w
(n′)
i,l − w
(n′)
l |
2 =
∑
l∈Li
{
lim
n′→∞
|w
(n′)
i,l − w
(n′)
l |
2
}
= 0. (72)
Consequently, limn′→∞ |w
(n′)
i,l − w
(n′)
l |
2 = 0, and the proof is complete.
Corollary 1. Let for some i, i ∈ A, limn′→∞w
(n′)
i,l = w
∗
i,l, then
1) limn′→∞ |w
(n′)
j,l − w
(n′)
l |
2 = 0, ∀ j ∈ Al, l ∈ L.
2) limn′→∞w
(n′)
j,l = w
∗
i,l =: w
∗
l .
Proof: The proof is a direct result of Lemmas 5, 7 and 8.
Now, using corollary 1 in (59) implies that
∑
i∈A
Υi(w
∗
i ) ≥
∑
i∈A
Υi(p), ∀ p ∈ ∆. (73)
Now, since by the assumptions Ui(·) is strictly concave for any i = 1, 2, · · · , m, the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are necessary and sufficient to guarantee the op-
timality of the allocation x∗ = (x∗1,x
∗
2, · · · ,x
∗
m), the limit point of the sequence {x
n
i,l}
∞
n=1,
that satisfies them. The Lagrangian for problem Max1 is
L(x,λ) =
m∑
i=1
Ui(xi)−
∑
l∈L
λl
[∑
i:l∈Li
xi,l − cl
]
(74)
and the KKT conditions are:
∂L(x,λ)
∂xi,l
|(x∗,λ∗) =
∂Ui(x
∗)
∂xi,l
− λ∗l = 0 ∀i, l (75)
λ∗l
[∑
i:l∈Li
x∗i,l − cl
]
= 0 ∀l (76)
Now, if we set λ∗l = w
∗
l (notice that, due to Corollary 1, w
∗
l = w
∗
i,l = w
∗
−i,l for every
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i, l), then, due to (73), we have
∂Υi(p)
∂pi,l
= 0⇒
w∗−i,l
(∑
j∈Al,j 6=i
x∗j,l − cl
γ
)
= w∗l
(∑
j∈Al,j 6=i
x∗j,l − cl
γ
)
= 0, ∀l ∈ L, (77)
which coincides with (76). Furthermore, employing Corollary 1 along with Lemma 1
imply that
∂
{
Ui(xi)−
∑
l∈Li
ti,l
}
∂xi,l
|xi,l=x∗i,l,wi=w∗l =
∂Ui(xi)
∂xi,l
|xi,l=x∗i,l − w
∗
l = 0 ∀ i, l. (78)
which coincides with (75). Therefore, the KKT conditions are satisfied and the proof is
complete.
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